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JEFFREY W. KNOPF
A new line of work on deterrence began emerging after the end of the Cold War and
gained momentum after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Building on a previous
characterization by Robert Jervis that identified three waves of deterrence research,1
this work is here designated the fourth wave. The fourth wave reflects a change from a
focus on relatively symmetrical situations of mutual deterrence to a greater concern
with what have come to be called asymmetric threats. The most important result has
been to reveal the value of adopting a broader concept of deterrence that is not exclu-
sively military in nature.
The initial wave of deterrence theorizing came after World War II and was driven
by the need to respond to a real-world problem – the invention of the atom bomb. The
second wave emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. It applied tools like game theory to
develop much of what became conventional wisdom about nuclear strategy (at
least in the West). Starting in the 1960s but really taking off in the 1970s, the third
wave used statistical and case-study methods to empirically test deterrence theory,
mainly against cases of conventional deterrence. The case-study literature also chal-
lenged the rational actor assumption employed in second-wave theory.
For at least a decade after Jervis published his seminal review, most research
involved ‘normal science’ contributions within the second and third waves, along
with lively debates across the existing theoretical and methodological divides.2
Even after the end of the Cold War and the rise of concerns about rogue states and
terrorism, scholars have continued to produce research that adds to and in some
cases challenges previous work in the first three waves.3 Nearly all of this research,
however, retains a focus on traditional interstate conflict. Given that it has a different
substantive focus than work that addresses asymmetric threats, recent scholarship that
deals with deterrence in the context of great power relations or regional rivalries will
not be considered part of the fourth wave.
Alongside ongoing work that grows out of the second and third waves, a distinct
new strand of deterrence research has emerged. Like the first wave, this fourth wave
is primarily a response to real-world developments – most notably, 9/11. For this
reason, again similar to the first wave, the latest wave has been more concerned
with developing deterrence strategy than deterrence theory. Attempts to test fourth-
wave ideas empirically have also been limited. Instead, the work has mainly been
conceptual and policy-oriented.
The roots of the fourth wave can be traced to the collapse of the Soviet Union. By
the second half of the 1990s, studies began appearing that focused on post-Cold War
deterrence,4 including some important pre-9/11 attempts to think about how to deter
terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).5 The terrorist attacks of
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September 11, 2001 created a much greater impetus for efforts to reexamine deter-
rence, so this review essay focuses on studies completed after 9/11. The attacks
not only raised obvious questions about whether it would be possible to deter non-
state actors willing to commit suicide for their cause. They also accentuated concerns
about WMD-seeking rogue states. In response, the George W. Bush administration
announced a new doctrine of preemption, leading many observers to conclude that
US strategy had abandoned deterrence.6
These challenges prompted many people to reexamine deterrence. Some focused
mainly on seeking ways to apply deterrence against terrorism. Others were motivated
by concerns about the preemption doctrine and preparations to put it into practice
through an invasion of Iraq. Still others were already engaged in reflecting on the
role of deterrence after the Cold War and sought to incorporate the implications of
9/11 and the Bush Doctrine into their thinking. Collectively, these efforts have pro-
duced a fourth wave in deterrence research (considerations of cyber-deterrence could
also be considered part of the fourth wave, but there is not yet enough published
research for a meaningful review). The following review aims to clarify what is
and is not new in the fourth wave, to identify where there is consensus and where
there is still significant disagreement, and to point out the most important remaining
problems and gaps. These latter will indicate where policymakers should still exer-
cise caution and where academic researchers could contribute through more rigorous
development of the underlying logic and empirical testing of suggestions made in the
fourth wave.
The area of greatest and most important consensus is that deterrence remains
viable and relevant, even in dealing with terrorism. Scholars also agree that the strat-
egy is unlikely to be foolproof, but significant disagreements remain over how
reliable it is likely to be with respect to different types of actors. There is also near
but not complete consensus that deterrence both will and should play a lesser role
today than in the Cold War. Whether it is wise to accompany the reduced role of
deterrence with a greater emphasis on the preventive use of force remains a
subject of intense disagreement however. There is also debate about whether it is
appropriate and would be effective to target the families and communities that
suicide terrorists come from.
Although there are some creative new ideas in the fourth wave, there are also
areas of continuity with previous discussions of deterrence. Some of the debates,
especially about deterring rogue states, echo prominent Cold War debates. The
fourth wave also draws on ideas from the second and third waves, such as the role
of assurances in making deterrence effective and the importance of integrating
deterrence into a larger framework that includes other policy tools. What most
distinguishes the work summarized here is its empirical focus; the fourth wave is
driven by attempts to think through how deterrence might operate in situations that
appear different from the traditional interstate rivalries that drove earlier theorizing.
The most noteworthy new development in this literature is a trend toward no longer
viewing deterrence exclusively in terms of nuclear or even conventional military
means. The fourth wave is giving rise to a broader concept of deterrence that still
includes but is not limited to threats of military retaliation.7 One especially innovative
































suggestion that merits follow-up research involves using information or discourse as
a source of influence.
Several issues still require further research and analysis. One important question
is the extent to which deterrence strategy needs to take into account unique features of
a target state’s political regime and strategic culture. This issue reflects a larger
problem in the literature, which is a tendency to assume that signs of non-rationality
in an adversary automatically make deterrence a bad bet. This is not necessarily the
case, and the fourth wave needs to develop a more complete picture of the factors
relevant for estimating the odds of deterrence success or failure. There is also still
considerable uncertainty about what kind of threatened response is most appropriate
for trying to deter the ultimate nightmare of nuclear terrorism. More broadly, the
question of what to try to deter in the first place has not been sufficiently addressed.
As the conclusion emphasizes, identifying the appropriate red-lines for a deterrence
strategy remains a critical task.
The remainder of this article reviews the state of fourth-wave research through six
major sections. First, it describes how the changed security environment has affected
the objectives of deterrence research. It next identifies major areas of consensus and
debate about the appropriate role of deterrence overall. This is followed by sections
that summarize research on the specific problems of deterring rogue states and
terrorists, respectively. An important strand of research on terrorism focuses solely
on nuclear or WMD terrorism, so this research is discussed in a separate section.
The concluding section identifies outstanding priorities for further fourth-wave
research and analysis.
The Changed Context for Deterrence Research
The fourth wave reflects the time and context in which it has emerged. The most signifi-
cant difference from the Cold War environment of the first three waves is a change in
focus from roughly symmetrical relations to asymmetric threats. Even in the Cold War,
questions about deterrence could arise in relations between very unequal actors, as in US
concerns about guerrilla movements or the emergence of China’s nuclear weapons
programme. The primary concern, however, was the superpower relationship, in
which the focus was nuclear, the two sides were similar in their level of military
capability, and deterrence eventually became mutual. Today, in the scenarios that
most concern many analysts and policymakers, the United States and many of its
friends and allies have clear military superiority over the actors they perceive as
posing the greatest threats. The resort to tactics like terrorism or insurgency and
efforts to acquire and perhaps use WMD are often described as asymmetric responses
to the overwhelming military advantage enjoyed by the United States and its partners.
The current situation is also asymmetric in a second sense. While the United
States had no choice but to accept the mutuality of deterrence in the Cold War,
today the clear US preference is for unidirectional deterrence. The United States
hopes to deter rogue states and terrorist organizations, but it does not want those
actors to be able to deter the United States. The US desire to avoid the development
of mutual deterrence in some ways makes the exercise of deterrence more
































challenging. It requires trying to deter other actors not just from launching attacks but
also from acquiring capabilities like nuclear weapons that could be used for deter-
rence against the United States even if those weapons are not actually used in an
attack. As will be discussed further in the conclusion, these policy goals make the
question of what to try to deter more salient.
Asymmetry has mixed implications however. While the current situation creates
new complications for deterrence, it also permits a less demanding yardstick for
measuring the value of deterrence. In the mutual deterrence environment of the
Cold War, stability became the overwhelming preoccupation. Deterrence could not
be allowed to fail even once, because failure might have meant mutual nuclear
annihilation. Today’s security environment makes possible a different metric.
Although any deterrence failure would have terrible consequences for some
people, for the United States and most other countries national survival is not at
stake. However undesirable, one or even a handful of deterrence failures would not
vitiate the value of deterrence. Because a single deterrence failure does not risk com-
plete destruction of the country, the standard for evaluating deterrence has changed
from the Cold War.8 Today, the key question is whether deterrence can make a posi-
tive contribution at the margins. Against contemporary threats from terrorism and
rogue states, a partially effective deterrent is less than ideal but is also meaningfully
better than no deterrence. Although the overarching goal remains preventing all
attacks if possible, preventing even some attacks is still better than preventing
none. For policy purposes, this makes the key question how to add increments to
the effectiveness of deterrence. Especially regarding terrorism, the focus has
changed from seeking a guarantee of success to finding ideas that could contribute
at the margins to reducing the number of attacks.9
The Overall Role of Deterrence
The bulk of the fourth wave is concerned with the challenges of deterring rogue states
and terrorists. Some of the work, however, steps back from these specific concerns to
consider the overall utility of deterrence in the post-Cold War world. This work
includes reflections by some senior scholars who were influential in previous waves,
including Alexander George, Colin Gray, Patrick Morgan, Lawrence Freedman, and
Robert Jervis. Not only these veteran deterrence theorists, but all of the literature in
the fourth wave is in complete agreement on one key point: deterrence remains relevant
and potentially useful against contemporary threats. Even Colin Gray, who built much
of his career on critiques of mainstream deterrence theory, argued in response to the
unveiling of the preemption doctrine that ‘deterrence, though diminished in signifi-
cance, remains absolutely essential as an element in U.S. grand strategy’.10
The agreement that deterrence remains usable does not imply a wish to return to
near-exclusive reliance on this strategy. There is also a near consensus that deterrence
both will not and should not play as central a role as it did during the Cold War.
Lawrence Freedman observes that the disappearance of the Soviet threat ‘pointed
back to the original concept of [deterrence as] an occasional stratagem rather than
a constant, all-purpose stance’.11 Patrick Morgan concurs that this is appropriate
































because deterrence ‘is inherently imperfect’ and cannot be made into ‘a completely
reliable tool of statecraft. That means it must be approached with care and used as part
of a larger tool kit’.12
In viewing deterrence as ‘inherently imperfect’, the fourth wave accepts critiques
of deterrence made by the third wave. Nevertheless, the fourth wave differs from the
third. The third wave focused almost entirely on the limitations of deterrence strategy.
In a policy environment that took for granted the necessity for deterrence, third-wave
research argued that the strategy was not always appropriate and sought to highlight
the circumstances in which deterrence might prove irrelevant or counterproductive.13
The fourth wave emerged in a different environment in which many now expressed
doubt that deterrence would be feasible even in dealing with threats against which it
would otherwise be appropriate. The latest wave hence stresses the reach rather than
the limits of deterrence. Although it does not see deterrence as a silver bullet, it argues
that deterrence can potentially be effective against a wider range of threats than
assumed by the conventional wisdom that emerged after 9/11.
Although most fourth-wave studies assert that deterrence should play a less
prominent role than it did in the Cold War, there are some apparent dissenters
from this position. The full extent of disagreement is hard to judge, because the
dissenters do not focus on the exact same issue as the studies discussed above.
Rather, the dissenters emphasize that deterrence still provides a useful organizing
framework for thinking about strategy. In a book defending the continuing utility
of deterrence, James Lebovic argues that ‘deterrence theory is not a Cold War
relic’, and he stresses ‘the value of addressing . . . [threats from rogue states and
terrorists] within a deterrence framework’.14 In a similar but somewhat stronger
endorsement, Elbridge Colby describes deterrence as a ‘logic to guide American
policymaking’, leading to a recommendation that ‘the policy of deterrence remains
today the best strategic posture for the United States’.15
Yet even these authors seem to accept that deterrence will not always be the right
policy. Both Lebovic and Colby mention the possibility that deterrence will fail,16
which would seem to indicate other policies might be necessary in those cases.
Thus, it is possible that they do not disagree with the conclusion that deterrence
will not be as central as it was during the Cold War. Rather, they seem to be
saying that insights about strategic interaction developed from theorizing during
the Cold War are still relevant for thinking about contemporary threats.17 This
makes it clear that the fourth wave is not a rejection of the previous waves.
Rather, part of its concern is to identify insights from the earlier waves that can be
adapted to new contexts. Overall, even if there are differences in how central a
role various authors want to assign to deterrence, this should not obscure the more
fundamental agreement that deterrence remains viable and has the potential to be
applied with some success against asymmetric threats.
Deterring Rogue States
The remaining areas of consensus and debate in the fourth wave mainly involve dis-
cussions about rogue states or terrorists specifically. In general, there is agreement
































that deterrence has a better chance of success with respect to state actors, even those
designated as rogues, than it does against violent non-state actors. Ironically, this has
led to greater disagreements in the analyses that deal with rogue states. Because no
one seems to believe that deterrence can be made 100 per cent effective against
terrorism, research on deterring terrorism focuses on how to gain at least some
leverage from this strategy. With state actors, it is possible to hope for a higher like-
lihood of deterrence success. This, however, has led to sharp debate about whether
the chances for success are good enough or more actively preventive measures are
needed. As several observers have noted, much of this debate directly echoes
similar Cold War-era debates.18
The basic fault line involves whether or not to reduce reliance on deterrence in
favour of a strategy that gives a greater role to active defences and offensive oper-
ations. Some analysts agreed with the George W. Bush administration that deterrence
is not sufficiently reliable against rogue regimes. This strand of the literature tended
to support Bush administration policies of building missile defences, being willing to
use force preventively, and (though with some dissenters) pushing for regime change.
These studies argued the preemption doctrine and other elements of Bush strategy
would also tend to bolster deterrence. Other studies disagreed on every point.
While no fourth-wave study completely dismisses deterrence, the analysts who
were sympathetic to Bush administration strategy tended to be more dubious than
the rest of the fourth wave about the prospects against rogue states. Their analysis
grew out of Cold War-era scepticism about the mainstream view of nuclear deter-
rence. A long line of work by Colin Gray and Keith Payne has argued that some
actors have very different value systems from the Western democracies and hence
might not be deterred by the threat of nuclear destruction of their societies.19 In his
most recent book, Payne calls the US approach to deterrence since the Cold War
‘the great American gamble’.20
Although analysts in this tradition have long viewed deterrence as unreliable,
they argue that the problems are worse now. Most fundamentally, they claim, the
United States does not understand some current adversaries, such as North Korea
and Iran, as well as it understood the Soviet Union.21 This makes it harder to know
what to ‘hold at risk’ in order to deter those adversaries. Terrorism compounds the
problem by creating a possibility that rogue regimes might deliberately hand off
WMD to terrorist groups in the hope that they could escape detection as the source
of an attack.22 The example of suicide terrorism has also led to heightened fears
that some state leaders might be willing to ‘volunteer’ their state to play the same
role.23 Iran has become the primary focus of such concerns. In an extreme formu-
lation of this concern, which ignores the manifold internal divisions in Iran, Adam
Garfinkle asks, ‘How does one deter people who . . . are willing and even eager –
from the sound of it – to turn their entire country and their entire religious sect
into a suicide bomb?’24
Given their doubts about the prospects for deterring rogue states, analysts in this
school of thought believe preventive attack will occasionally be necessary. However,
they do not actually view deterrence as impossible. Instead, they generally described
the Bush preemption doctrine as a measure that would also strengthen deterrence.
































A.R. Knott, for example, asserts that ‘Forceful pre-emptive action has a deterrent
effect of its own, not only on those that are near to committing an act, but also on
those who are planning attacks in the longer term’.25
The preponderant position in the fourth wave, however, disputes the above con-
clusions. Several studies have offered a comparative assessment of the relative merits
of deterrence and preventive attack and found the latter option more problematic.26
On the one hand, these studies point out that preventive action does not always
succeed in stopping WMD programmes and that it can have undesirable second-
order effects. In particular, another US military attack on a Muslim state like Iran
would be likely to stimulate further anti-US terrorism. On the other hand, these
studies observe that there have been many past cases in which doubts were expressed
about the deterrability of other actors, sometimes leading to calls for preventive
action. Before 9/11, arguments about the fragility of deterrence had been made
with respect to the Soviet Union, as well as China under Mao, Egypt under Nasser,
North Korea under both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and Iraq during Saddam
Hussein’s reign. While Egypt, Iraq, and perhaps the Soviet Union did use chemical
weapons, none of these states ever used WMD against any state capable of nuclear
retaliation. This historical record suggests that it is possible to deter WMD use by
rogue regimes and that, while it is not possible to guarantee success, deterrence is
not as unreliable as the sceptics imply. The other possibility noted above, that deter-
rence might fail because a rogue state, rather than launch its own attack, thinks it can
get away with transferring WMD to terrorists, will be discussed below in connection
with the research on deterring WMD terrorism.
If deterrence and preventive attack were mutually reinforcing, as supporters of a
preemption doctrine suggest, or even simply alternative options, there would be no
reason not to keep the option of preemption rather ostentatiously on the table. The
problem is that the two might instead work at cross purposes. This observation led
many fourth-wave studies to argue that the Bush administration emphasis on preemp-
tion, especially when combined with rhetoric calling for regime change, tended not to
reinforce but to undercut deterrence. This analysis drew on Thomas Schelling’s
famous second-wave observation that deterrent threats must be paired with assur-
ances that the threat will not be implemented if the other actor refrains from challen-
ging one’s deterrent commitment.27 With respect to Bush administration policies
toward Iraq before the war, which gave the impression the United States would
seek Saddam’s removal even if he cooperated with weapons inspectors, Robert
Jervis concluded, ‘The administration seems to have trouble with Schelling’s basic
point that if the other is to be influenced, threats to act if the other refuses to
comply with demands must be paired with promises not to take action if the other
does cooperate’.28 As several studies point out, if rogue regimes believe that a
preemptive attack or effort to impose regime change is likely even if they refrain
from using WMD, this only increases their incentives to acquire nuclear weapons
as a deterrent and to use WMD first if they believe a US attack is imminent or
their regime is about to be overthrown.29 Indeed, even some analysts who have
expressed support for policies of preemption or regime change have acknowledged
these strategies can make proliferation or deterrence failure more likely.30
































Ultimately, policy choices regarding rogue states involve trade-offs. Although the
preponderance of fourth-wave research suggests the probability of deterrence failure
leading to a WMD attack is quite low, the residual risk of deterrence failure still leads
some people to favour offensive operations to eliminate WMD programmes. Derek
Smith contends that ‘even a low level of incidence [of potentially undeterrable
actors] is a major cause for concern given the potential effects of WMD’. To
Smith, this puts the burden of proof on deterrence advocates to prove the strategy
will not fail.31 Gerard Alexander is even more explicit in judging the trade-off:
‘While false positives in these matters (unnecessary wars) are costly, type 2 errors
(false negatives) have become much more costly with the development of
unconventional weapons.’32
Knopf challenges this assessment.33 Noting that the 1995 Tokyo subway attack
killed 12 people and the 2001 anthrax mailings killed five, Knopf observes that use
of WMD is not automatically catastrophic. Without an effort to make a realistic
estimate of the consequences of a potential deterrence failure, it is not possible to
conclude that a deterrence failure would necessarily be more costly than a preventive
military action meant to forestall such a possibility. This means the burden of proof
should not be placed on either side; instead, the costs and risks of both strategies
should be assessed without a starting presumption in favour of either. Lebovic
goes further and argues that the trade-offs actually favour deterrence. He claims
that ‘reckless US preemptive policies are a greater threat to the US than the mere
possession of nonconventional weapons by rogue states’. Given the likelihood that
deterrence will work, ‘the worst-case scenario for the US and its allies is not that a
rogue state will come into possession of a nuclear weapon. Instead, the worst case
is that, because of preemptive efforts, a war erupts . . . in which the offending
weapons are actually used.’34 Arguments on both sides have generally been put
forward without benefit of thorough research to estimate the actual probabilities or
consequences of failure for deterrence versus those of other options. Further research
and analysis, including efforts to present the possible risks and trade-offs to policy-
makers and the public in a way that would facilitate informed debate, remains one
of the greatest needs in the literature.
Tailoring Deterrence
Although fourth-wave research on deterring rogue states involves sharp disagreement
over the relationship between and relative merits of deterrence and preventive attack,
there is one area of near consensus. A wide range of authors agree that it does not
make sense to rely on a single, ‘one size fits all’ deterrent posture.35 Most believe
that maximizing the chances of deterrence success will require gaining as much
knowledge as possible about the perceptions and value systems of potential adver-
saries. This is not a new idea, but rather a point that has gained greater emphasis
in the fourth wave. Even during the Cold War, there were efforts to ascertain
whether or not the Soviet Union thought about nuclear weapons in a manner
similar to the United States, but many thought the consequences of nuclear war
were so obviously horrific as to make deterrence existential even if there were
differences in the two sides’ military doctrines. In the fourth wave, however, it is
































increasingly taken as a truism that deterrence must be tailored to each individual case
based on a detailed understanding of the other side.36 In fact, Bush administration
policy moved in a direction consistent with this line of thinking and embraced a
strategy officially labelled ‘tailored deterrence’.37
A White Paper by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) recommends
the Obama administration continue this approach. It contends that deterrence must be
shaped to ‘the unique circumstances of each situation’ and ‘may need to be
personalized down to the level of a handful of key adversarial decision-makers’.38
Jeffrey Lantis points out that it might also be important to take into account actors
below the leadership level; for example, it may be useful to send tailored messages
to militaries that have a strong organization culture.39 Consistent with the trend
toward a broader notion of deterrence identified in this review, the IFPA study and
other recent work on tailored deterrence also claim that tailoring will require
incorporating a range of non-military tools, such as financial sanctions.40
Although there is general consensus that a return to the stereotypical Cold War
model of deterrence will not be appropriate for all contingencies, there are some
dissenting notes on the move towards tailoring deterrence to individual actors. It
makes sense to learn as much as possible about potential adversaries, but it does
not follow from this that deterrence should be tailored to the maximum extent
possible to each individual actor one seeks to deter. Knopf expresses concern that
changing the message for each individual actor could lead the deterrent signal to
get lost in the noise of individual tailoring.41 Morgan suggests, moreover, that it is
probably impossible to completely figure out the other side’s culture and its
leader’s personality. Morgan argues that the value of deterrence can be to cut
through such complexities and present a simple message loudly and clearly enough
that many different actors can understand it.42 Rather than individually tailored
postures, Knopf proposes a middle-range, ‘situation-specific’ posture. Such an
approach would lay out the range of possible responses that would follow a particular
proscribed behaviour, such as providing WMD to terrorists, regardless of the
particular actor who acts in this way. This is a debate that is just beginning to be
joined, and there is a clear need for future research on how to overcome the challenges
to implementing tailored deterrence and, even more importantly, on the question of
how far it makes sense to go in the direction of individual tailoring as opposed to
more generic deterrent postures.43
Deterring Terrorism
Recent research on deterring rogue states has its roots in earlier Cold War debates,
which is not surprising given that past research focused on deterring states. In
contrast, the issue of deterring terrorism received only sporadic attention during
the Cold War. After September 11, many observers dismissed the applicability of
deterrence to non-state actors. They pointed to the difficulties of finding effective
threats both against individual terrorists, who may care more about heavenly than
earthly rewards and are willing to commit suicide for their cause, and against terrorist
organizations that ‘lack a return address’ against which to retaliate. These same
































challenges spurred others to look for ways around the obstacles to utilizing
deterrence. Ironically, the very fact that the prospects for deterring terrorism
appear so daunting has produced a greater degree of consensus in this area. Most
research has been concerned simply with identifying ways to gain some leverage
from this strategy. Although there are still areas of debate, a fair amount of consensus
has emerged on the basic approaches that make sense.
Three possible approaches to deterring terrorism have received the most attention.
First, many of proposed approaches to deterrence are indirect in nature, intended to
pressure third parties who facilitate terrorism rather than terrorist operatives them-
selves. Second, this research shows renewed appreciation for Glenn Snyder’s
concept of ‘deterrence by denial’.44 In contrast to deterrence by punishment, which
threatens to inflict costs through retaliation after an attack, denial strategies aim to
dissuade a potential attacker by convincing them that the effort will not succeed
and they will be denied the benefits they hope to obtain. The third and most novel
approach involves challenging terrorists’ justifications for violence, an approach
that has been labelled both deterrence by counter-narrative and by delegitimization.
Consistent with the broader trend identified here, all three approaches rely at least
partly on sources of deterrence that are not only non-nuclear but non-military in
nature. One other point of consensus is also worth reiterating. Despite widespread
public doubts that terrorism can be deterred, studies on deterring terrorism argue
unanimously that it is possible, though not necessarily easy. There is also one signifi-
cant area of disagreement, involving whether it makes sense to threaten retaliation
against the communities that terrorists claim to represent.
Indirect Deterrence
Most of the major ideas for how to apply deterrence to terrorism appeared fairly soon
after 9/11. A short book published in 2002 by Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins of RAND
has been especially influential. Their key insight involved the value of disaggregating
a terrorist network into its component elements. Although the suicide terrorist who
has hijacked an airplane is almost certainly beyond the reach of deterrence, other
actors involved in the terrorist enterprise might not be. As Davis and Jenkins put it:
It is a mistake to think of influencing al Qaeda as though it were a single entity;
rather, the targets of US influence are the many elements of the al Qaeda
system, which comprises leaders, lieutenants, financiers, logisticians and
other facilitators, foot soldiers, recruiters, supporting population segments,
and religious or otherwise ideological figures. A particular leader may not be
easily deterrable, but other elements of the system (e.g., state supporters or
wealthy financiers living the good life while supporting al Qaeda in the
shadows) may be.45
Thinking of al Qaeda as a system opens the door to deterrence by punishment.
The various supporters and enablers of terrorism who are not themselves eager to
sacrifice their own lives for the cause can be threatened with retaliation for their
role in facilitating terrorist operations. The threatened response need not be lethal,
but could, depending on the actor, involve financial sanctions or imprisonment.
































This approach is good example of what Alexander George has described as
‘indirect deterrence’.46 Traditionally, deterrent threats have been aimed directly at
a potential attacker. Indirect deterrence, in contrast, is not aimed at attackers them-
selves, but at third parties whose actions could affect the likelihood that a potential
attacker can or will carry out an attack. The likely need to pursue an indirect approach
was a major theme in a study conducted for the National Academy of Sciences soon
after 9/11 and has been echoed in much of the subsequent research.47 In sum, there is
broad agreement that threats to punish state sponsors of terrorism and private
enablers, such as financiers, might help prevent terrorism not by directly deterring
the terrorists themselves but by deterring these other parties from providing
support terrorists need to carry out their operations.
The indirect approach has an important implication. Just because a terrorist
organization is a non-state actor does not mean that states are irrelevant. If a terrorist
group relies upon or benefits from state assistance, then the state can be threatened
with consequences if it does not cease providing support. Wyn Bowen has pointed
out that threats to take action against state sponsors may be more a matter of compel-
lence than deterrence.48 If a state is already supporting a terrorist group, the purpose
of the threat is to get it to stop an activity already underway rather than to prevent
initiation of that activity (and the same point applies to private supporters as well).
Since the conventional wisdom holds that compellence is harder than deterrence,
Bowen cautions that it may be difficult to successfully coerce state sponsors to
abandon their support – though this does not lead him to recommend against trying.
Even failed compellence, however, as in the effort after 9/11 to coerce the Taliban
to turn over Osama bin Laden, can have deterrent benefits if there is appropriate
follow-up. In such cases, most of the literature points out, effective action to
remove an offending regime from power can exercise a deterrent effect on other
states.49 For efforts to deter other non-state actors in the future, rather than state spon-
sors, the fate of al Qaeda is more relevant. Colby thus concludes, ‘deterrence requires
that the United States take every step to destroy al Qaeda in order for our deterrent
against terrorists to be credible’.50
The goal of destroying al Qaeda creates complications because, as Davis and
Jenkins put it, ‘deterrence and eradication do not fit together easily’.51 The US inten-
tion to go after al Qaeda whether or not it launches further attacks means there can be
no US promise to let the organization survive if it refrains from future terrorism.
Without such an assurance, using deterrence by punishment against al Qaeda as
whole is nearly impossible.52 As noted above, though, threats of punishment might
still work with elements of the network that enables Qaeda terrorism. It is important
to recognize that this will make assurances necessary. To threaten private financiers
or state sponsors with punishment if they support terrorism also requires promising to
leave them be if they desist from aiding al Qaeda.
This insight is the basis for a proposal that in effect applies indirect deterrence to
terrorist organizations as well. Trager and Zagorcheva focus on deterring terrorist
groups that are not affiliated with al Qaeda from allying with bin Laden’s group.53
Some groups that have similar ideologies can still be more concerned with local
political struggles than with al Qaeda’s global jihad. If so, Trager and Zagorcheva
































argue, their local goals can be held at risk. If the United States is willing to indicate
that it will not act against local groups as long as they do not assist al Qaeda, it could
deter them from doing so by threatening to intervene to block them from achieving
their local political goals if they do assist al Qaeda. Trager and Zagorcheva’s proposal
is a logical extension of the indirect deterrence approach. Instead of focusing on
deterring elements of the existing network, however, it seeks to prevent al Qaeda
from expanding its network. Trager and Zagorcheva thus do not deal with how to
deter al Qaeda itself, but their analysis does have an important policy implication.
It suggests President Bush made a mistake to declare a global war on terror. By
suggesting the United States would go on the offensive against all terrorist groups,
it gave them an incentive to join together as allies facing a common threat. Trager
and Zagorcheva also support their analysis with a case study of contrasting
approaches utilized against two different insurgencies in the Philippines. This
makes their article almost unique among fourth-wave studies in actually testing its
ideas against empirical evidence.
Deterrence by Denial
The fact that many analysts do not see a viable way to use deterrence by punishment
directly against the Qaeda organization as a whole has led much of the literature to
focus instead on deterrence by denial. Davis and Jenkins identified two approaches,
subsequently developed more fully by others, that fit this mode of deterrence. The
first involves increasing the probability that individual attacks will fail. Davis and
Jenkins observed that ‘even hardened terrorists dislike operational risk and may be
deterred by uncertainty and risk’. This means that homeland security measures and
other steps to reduce the chances that terrorists can carry out a spectacular attack
also have deterrent effects. Terrorists ‘may be willing to risk or give their lives, but
not in futile attacks. Thus, better defensive measures can help to deter or deflect,
even if they are decidedly imperfect.’54 Indeed, even before the Davis and Jenkins
study appeared, a study conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory also
proposed that increasing the chances of operational failure could deter some terrorist
attacks,55 and many subsequent studies have echoed this conclusion.
Robert Anthony has provided empirical backing to the notion that anything that
reduces the estimated probability of operational success could deter. Anthony notes
that the 9/11 hijackers took multiple test trips on the same flights they later hijacked
because they wanted to convince themselves they would not be stopped before board-
ing on the day of the attacks. This suggests that successfully identifying and arresting
one or more of the hijackers before 9/11 might have deterred the entire plot.56
As a second observation consistent with denial, Davis and Jenkins stressed the
importance of showing that even successful terrorist attacks will not produce
larger-scale effects on the United States. Measures to manage and mitigate the
consequences of an attack and to speed recovery afterward could contribute to this
type of denial by making it harder for terrorists to achieve the spectacular results
they seek. Bolstering societal resilience is especially important.57 When a society
can demonstrate the ability to withstand terrorism, it sends a message that using
this tactic will not enable terrorist organizations to achieve their goals.
































Deterrence depends significantly on convincing organizations such as al Qaeda
and those who support it that any notion of defeating the United States – much
less ‘bringing the United States down’ – is ridiculous. . . . The United States
needs to demonstrate that it will not be brought down and will not close
itself down . . .58
Although Davis and Jenkins did not use the punishment and denial terminology,
other studies have invoked the distinction and argued that both approaches will be
necessary to deter terrorism.59 Several analyses especially emphasize the second
type of denial strategy discussed by Davis and Jenkins. They add some important
amendments, however, regarding how to make this type of denial effort effective.
It is not enough to show the United States will not be crippled or closed down by
an attack. It is also necessary, several studies point out, to show that successful
attacks will not advance terrorists’ larger political goals. A remarkable report by a
Student Task Force at the National War College (NWC) stressed that one way to
deter terror groups is to ensure that there is ‘doubt placed in the terrorist’s mind
that even if acts of terrorism are successfully carried out, the overall aims may not
be achieved’. Although it ‘will take time’ to achieve this, the ‘bottom line is that
terrorists must believe that ultimately their efforts would be futile’.60 Some influential
senior scholars have endorsed this idea as well, using it as a central argument for why
they reject the premise that terrorism is undeterrable. Colin Gray points out that,
despite the grandiosity of its objectives, al Qaeda ‘functions strategically’ in trying
to use its suicide attacks to advance those objectives. As a result, ‘It can be deterred
by the fact and expectation of strategic failure’.61
A helpful framework for identifying different ways to use deterrence by denial
against terrorism has been produced by James Smith and Brent Talbot.62 They
observe that denial strategies can be implemented at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels. Efforts to improve homeland defences and increase operational
risk produce tactical deterrence. Smith and Talbot refer to this as ‘denial of opportu-
nity’. At the operational level, the goal is ‘denial of capability’ that terrorists require
for an ongoing campaign of attacks. Here, denial and punishment can work in
synergy. The indirect approach that threatens retaliation against third-party enablers
can contribute to a direct version of denial by preventing terrorist organizations from
getting the resources they need, such as money, weapons materials, and safe havens.
Finally, at the strategic level, deterrence by denial involves the approach emphasized
by the NWC Student Task Force, Gray, and others. Strategic deterrence by denial
entails the ‘denial of objectives’, that is, showing that terrorism will fail to achieve
terrorist groups’ end goals.
An analysis by Dutter and Seliktar suggests the strategic level is the most
important one. As long as terrorists believe there is a chance of success in achieving
their fundamental goals eventually, the risk of tactical or operational failure might
not be sufficient to deter them from trying to launch further attacks.63 In an important
cautionary note for denial efforts at the tactical level, Alex Wilner points out that al
Qaeda has still tried to target airliners and embassies despite significantly improved
defences against attacks on both. A success despite the increased obstacles would
































produce a sensational result for the group, while even failures generate new
publicity.64
Analysts who see promise in deterrence by denial at the strategic level argue it is
especially important to avoid public and governmental overreaction to terrorism,
since manipulation of fear among the public or government officials is what
enables terrorists to achieve their objectives.65 The potential sticking point in this
approach is that avoiding overreaction can be difficult, because elected officials
feel public pressure to take dramatic, visible measures to minimize the terrorist
threat in the short term.66 Both further public education about how terrorism exploits
public fear and strong political leadership will be necessary to realize the potential of
denial at the strategic level.
Another approach, which overlaps with denial strategies, has been proposed by
Doron Almog.67 He suggests adapting the Israeli notion of ‘cumulative deterrence’.
Israeli strategists believe their country achieved deterrence against the Arab front-line
states by repeatedly defeating them in a series of military confrontations. Although
each war represented a deterrence failure in the short term, successive Israeli victories
eventually convinced Arab states they could not defeat Israel militarily, creating
deterrence as the cumulative result. Almog argues that a combination of successfully
interdicting some terrorists, retaliating for those attacks that do occur, and demon-
strating long-term patience could work similarly to establish cumulative deterrence
against terrorism. Almog’s suggestion is similar to the idea of strategic deterrence
by denial, in that it involves convincing terrorists over time that they will not
prevail. It differs, however, because his emphasis on effective retaliation means
that Almog puts more weight on punishment than denial. Whether or not cumulative
deterrence offers a useful framework for preventing terrorism hence depends on
whether punishing forms of retaliation would add a significant increment of
deterrence to the indirect and denial approaches outlined so far.
Deterrence by Punishment
The question of whether threats of retaliation could be effective as a direct deterrent
against terrorism is an obvious one. This is the issue on which there is the greatest
disagreement in the literature. Some analysts believe that threats analogous to the
Cold War threat of massive retaliation are necessary to establish deterrence, while
others strongly criticize the idea of seeking to deter terrorism in this way. This ques-
tion arises in discussions of both conventional and WMD terrorism, with the impor-
tant difference that only in the latter case is there ever consideration of a nuclear
response. Punishment scenarios for WMD terrorism are discussed separately
below, while this section considers proposals for direct deterrence by punishment
as a response to terrorism in general. Here, debate centres on whether or not it is a
good idea to threaten retaliation against the families or larger communities from
which terrorists originate.
Among those who advocate this approach are several Israeli analysts who have
drawn conclusions from their country’s long experience as a target of terrorism.
Gerald Steinberg wrote one of the first articles published after 9/11 that made the
case that terrorism can be deterred. In it, he deliberately invoked the notion of
































massive retaliation. He argued, ‘it is important to identify high-value targets, includ-
ing family and supporters, that will cause even the most radical leaders to weigh the
costs and benefits of their actions . . .’ Steinberg added that responses might have to
appear ‘excessive’ or ‘disproportionate’ in order to make the costs great enough to
deter further terrorism.68 Ariel Merari, Shmuel Bar, and Amos Malka have made
similar arguments, stressing that the defender needs to cultivate an image of being
‘willing to go “all the way”’ or ‘go crazy’.69 According to Bar, even more important
than the severity of the response is its certainty. Bar believes that deterrence erodes
quickly, leading him to conclude that repeated counter-strikes are necessary to
establish temporary periods of deterrence against terrorism.70
In a similar vein, Uri Fisher suggests that only harsh reprisals, including threats to
kill family members, can deter terrorism, but he worries that US liberal values will
prevent the United States from ever implementing the type of policy that could
provide effective deterrence.71 This concern about domestic constraints is overstated.
There has been no US public backlash against civilian casualties that have resulted
from US air strikes in Afghanistan or Pakistan. More importantly, a lot of the litera-
ture reviewed here suggests there are other, possibly more effective ways to deter
terrorism, so any constraints on the use of harsh retaliatory measures might not
make deterrence impossible.
Others question whether deterrence should be sought by threatening collective
punishment. Overall, the majority of fourth-wave studies reject this. The objections
are partly moral, as retaliation would be directed at people who do not necessarily
support terrorism and at least some of whom are innocent bystanders. Most studies
also criticize threats to punish families and communities for practical reasons
however. Davis and Jenkins contend that indiscriminate retaliation would diminish
the moral legitimacy of the US effort, which could reduce international support for
and cooperation with the US campaign against terror.72 Returning to the Israeli
example, Jonathan Schachter contends that collective punishment has been ineffec-
tive because community members direct their anger at Israel after reprisals rather
than hold terror groups accountable for provoking those reprisals.73
The biggest problem, according to most analysts, is that targeting families or
broader populations is more likely to increase support for al Qaeda or other terrorist
groups than to decrease it.74 Indeed, groups often use terrorism with the intent of
provoking an excessive government reaction in order to prove their claims that the
government in question is brutal or oppressive. Hence, it is important not to fall
into the terrorists’ trap by reacting in a heavy-handed manner if that is what they
are trying to elicit.75 Some analysts warn in particular against targeting holy
sites.76 The basic equation is simple: to be worthwhile, a retaliatory threat or
action has to convince more people to abandon the terrorist cause than it incites to
join it. Just as al Qaeda’s attacks on symbolic targets like the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon aroused American ire, so too would targeting religious symbols
be more likely to provoke than to deter.
There are hence good reasons to be wary of retaliating against family members or
societal targets. Practicing deterrence by denial (rather than punishment) with respect
to these targets is still important however. For example, the NWC Student Task Force
































points to the need to make sure families do not gain financially if a family member
conducts a suicide terror mission.77 This will help deter those who are recruited by
the promise of financial rewards for their families.
It is also important to recognize that large-scale military retaliation is not the only
possible way to implement a direct punishment strategy. Some propose that targeted
killings of mid-level terrorist operatives could have a deterrent effect by increasing
the personal risks for those who plan and prepare terrorist attacks but do not them-
selves conduct them. In one of the handful of fourth-wave studies based on systematic
empirical research, Wilner found that targeting killings in Afghanistan did not reduce
the rate of terrorism, but did shift it toward lower value targets and less effective
forms of attack.78 It is not possible to tell from the data, however, whether this
shift arose from terrorist operatives being deterred from certain attacks out of fear
for their personal safety or instead from terrorist capabilities being degraded by the
loss of key personnel.
Others speculate that lethal forms of punishment might not be the most effective.
Brad Roberts suggests that for terrorist foot soldiers who want to die for the cause, the
threat to arrest and imprison them may be a greater deterrent than the threat to kill
them.79 The NWC Student Task Force also envisions the threat of life in prison as
a possible deterrent. The group’s report argues, ‘if captured, the terrorist’s fate
must be worse than a martyr’s death. . . . A terrorist may be willing to die for his
cause but be unwilling to spend the rest of his life in the unglamorous, isolated,
largely forgotten role of a prisoner.’80 This again highlights the value of broadening
the concept of deterrence. Although the United States views itself as engaged in a war
on terrorism, this does not preclude also using the criminal justice system as an
additional source of deterrence.
Finally, most fourth-wave studies recognize that any form of deterrence, includ-
ing against terrorism, results from an actor’s comparison of the expected utility of
attacking versus that of not attacking. To bolster deterrence therefore requires
improving the attractiveness of alternatives to terrorism. Bruno Frey observes, for
example, that increasing opportunities for peaceful political participation and for
membership in civil society organizations would reduce the incentives for the disaf-
fected to press their cause through terrorism.81 As noted above, though, some studies
exclusively emphasize the need for greater toughness. These studies tend to be wary
of any efforts to create positive alternatives out of fear these will convey an image of
weakness. This issue needs to be addressed by more systematic empirical research.
Based on existing deterrence theory, however, there are strong logical grounds for
expecting that deterrence will be more effective when it is paired with efforts to
improve the available alternatives to the path of terrorism.
Deterring WMD Terrorism
A number of studies focus not on how to deter terrorism in general but instead on the
specific problem of how to deter terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.
Because the detonation of a nuclear bomb would be much more destructive than
the most likely chemical or biological terrorism scenarios, most of these studies
































focus exclusively on deterring nuclear terrorism, though some frame their discussion
in terms of deterring WMD terrorism without distinguishing nuclear from chemical
or biological threats. The majority of analysts assume that if a group like al Qaeda
manages to acquire a nuclear device, they will use it. Hence, most studies focus on
how to deter third parties from assisting terrorist groups in obtaining WMD. There
are, however, some analysts who think it might be possible to directly deter terrorist
groups from using WMD.
Proposals to Threaten Societal Targets
Similar to the analysts discussed above who favour applying direct deterrence by pun-
ishment against conventional forms of terrorism, some scholars propose threatening a
counter-value response in the event of WMD terrorism. Daniel Whiteneck, Elbridge
Colby, and Paul Kapur all argue for the need to threaten retaliation against societal
targets in response to a WMD attack.82 Kapur makes it clear that the US retaliation
need not be nuclear and indicates that he considers threats against society legitimate
only in the case of nuclear terrorism, not conventional terrorism. Colby suggests that
retaliation does not necessarily even have to be military and would likewise limit
counter-society targeting only to ‘catastrophic’ WMD terrorism (but including
biological and not just nuclear attacks). The three vary somewhat in the targets
they propose holding at risk. Whiteneck lists family members, religious schools,
and public infrastructure as possible targets, and Colby also includes food and
housing. Kapur proposes more broadly that both the population and territory with
which terrorist groups identify could be threatened.83
Colby differs from others who advocate punishing community members, in that
he frames this entirely as an effort at indirect rather than direct deterrence. He does
not believe counter-value targeting will cause terrorist leaders to hesitate. Instead, he
envisions that threats against those who support or passively allow terrorist activities
will pressure those actors to take steps to prevent a terrorist group in their midst from
carrying out a WMD attack.84
Even those who advocate counter-society targeting do not generally call for
responding to WMD terrorism with nuclear retaliation against non-state actors
(state sponsors, discussed below, are a somewhat different story). The US Defense
Department even commissioned a team at West Point’s Combating Terrorism
Center to study whether there is a role for nuclear weapons in deterring terrorist
organizations. The study team firmly recommended against any use of nuclear
threats. Not only might such threats increase general sympathy for al Qaeda, the
study concluded, they could also sway Muslim opinion toward greater support for
al Qaeda acquiring or even using nuclear weapons.85
Proposals to seek deterrence through threats against society are not the main
thrust of suggestions for how to deter WMD terrorism, however, because all the argu-
ments against punishing community members for acts of terrorism in general also
apply in the case of WMD attacks. But fourth-wave analysts have not all given up
on direct forms of deterrence. Instead, several have identified a possible alternative
to Cold War-style massive retaliation.
































Deterrence by Public Backlash
An alternative route to direct deterrence comes from the observation that, for al
Qaeda at least, sympathy and support among Muslims is an important centre of
gravity. If Qaeda leaders came to expect that key audiences would react negatively
to new attacks, this could serve as a source of restraint on terrorist behaviour.86
Lew Dunn has explicitly connected this insight to a proposed path for deterring
nuclear terrorism. He contends that ‘nuclear use does have the potential of provoking
revulsion among the very communities that bin Laden is seeking to rally’. This makes
it important ‘to shape perceptions among al Qaeda leaders of the possibility that
nuclear or biological weapons use could backfire, alienating . . . the wider Islamic
community’.87
To increase the chances of such a backlash, analysts call for putting forward or
eliciting challenges that could discredit the ideological justifications terrorists
invoke for WMD acquisition or use. According to Dunn, one way to do this is to
encourage declarations by Islamic clerics and other respected Muslim leaders that
indiscriminate killing, as would result from WMD use, is illegitimate.88 Brad
Roberts adds that groups affiliated with al Qaeda could also exert pressure against
use if they expect local reactions in the areas where they operate would be negative.89
In short, if al Qaeda’s leaders come to anticipate that WMD use would hurt their
cause, this might dissuade them from such a course.
The study by the Combating Terrorism Center endorses this approach, labelling it
‘deterrence by counter-narrative’.90 Alex Wilner uses the label ‘deterrence by dele-
gitimization’, which he defines as ‘targeting what terrorists believe’.91 The latter
term is more parallel to punishment and denial, because it refers to the way a deterrent
effect is achieved, while a counter-narrative, like military retaliation, is a means that
can be used. In practice, delegitimization is not a truly different way of generating
deterrence. Instead, it blends the other two, seeking to deny terrorists the benefit of
a public rally while perhaps also imposing the punitive cost of a loss in previous
public support. Because the means used are so distinctive, however, it is worth
retaining a separate label for this approach.
As support for the potential of this approach, analysts point to several pieces of
evidence that suggest Qaeda leaders are indeed sensitive to how the Muslim commu-
nity perceives their actions. They cite, among other things, a letter from al Qaeda’s
number two leader, Ayman al-Zawahari, to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al
Qaeda in Iraq before he was killed by an air strike in 2006. In the letter, Zawahari
instructed Zarqawi that his methods, including indiscriminate attacks on Muslim civi-
lians and the release of videos showing hostage beheadings, were so excessive they
had become counterproductive. According to Zawahiri, ‘the strongest weapon which
the mujahadeen enjoy . . . is popular support from the Muslim masses . . . [meaning]
the mujahed movement must avoid any action that the masses do not understand or
approve . . .’92
As with some of the other proposals discussed above, effective implementation
of deterrence by counter-narrative will be challenging. Adam Garfinkle observes
that it is difficult for non-Muslims to influence relations among Muslims.93 Indeed,
































there is always a risk that efforts by a foreign government to influence a state’s or a
community’s internal debates will provoke a backlash against outside interference.
But this is not a reason to reject this approach out of hand. Rather, it points to the
need for additional thinking and, if possible, empirical research about how to
implement a delegitimization strategy successfully.
This proposed approach highlights another way in which thinking about
deterrence is becoming broader. This effort at deterrence would not rely on military
reprisal, nor for that matter on some of the other tools discussed so far, such as
homeland defences or criminal justice measures. It instead represents an attempt to
use discourse as a source of leverage. The fourth wave in general has involved con-
sideration of the role that non-military tools of national power might play in deterrence.
Delegitimization proposals show that information (or strategic communication) could
be one of those tools. As the most innovative suggestion in the fourth wave, this
approach merits serious follow-up research to ascertain its potential.
The Possibility of State Assistance
Although, as the preceding paragraphs indicate, there are some suggestions for deter-
ring terrorist groups directly, most of the research on deterring WMD terrorism
emphasizes indirect deterrence. Despite the ideas noted above, it is hard to have
confidence that a group that has obtained WMD can reliably be convinced not to
use it. Hence, the primary focus has been preventing terrorists from obtaining such
weapons in the first place. With respect to nuclear weapons, though not necessarily
chemical or biological agents, terrorist organizations will require outside assistance.
They do not have the capacity to produce fissile materials, so they will have to acquire
fissile materials or an actual nuclear device that were manufactured elsewhere. This
creates an opening, and indeed an urgent necessity, to deter third parties from
assisting terror organizations in acquiring nuclear materials.
There are several potential scenarios by which terrorists could acquire such
materials. There could be deliberate transfer by a state or by sub-national actors
acting without their government’s knowledge. There could also be inadvertent
leakage from poorly secured facilities, through either theft by outsiders or diversion
to the black market by insiders. The fourth wave includes suggestions for establishing
deterrence against each of these scenarios. These generally involve threatening pun-
ishment against any actor that enables terrorists to obtain WMD. As Kapur points out,
such efforts could also contribute to deterrence by denial by making it more difficult
or more expensive for terrorist organizations to acquire nuclear materials.94
There is broad consensus over the basic approach to deterring WMD assistance to
terrorists, but considerable debate about the details of implementing such deterrence
and the overall likelihood it will be effective. Some of the disagreements emerged
from debates about the necessity of the Iraq War. As part of its case for invading
Iraq, the Bush administration emphasized the danger that rogue states might deliber-
ately provide WMD to terrorists. The administration discounted the likelihood of
deterring such transfers by asserting that rogue regimes might believe they could
keep their role secret and hence avoid being held accountable.
































A number of fourth-wave studies challenged these assertions. Sceptics of the
deliberate transfer scenario put forward three main counter-arguments. First,
because rogue regimes will find it hard to produce more than a handful of bombs
initially, they are unlikely to give away such a scarce resource, which is also impor-
tant for their own security.95 Second, any transfer would mean that the regime would
no longer control the weapon and would face a risk that a non-state actor might turn
the weapon against the regime itself.96 Finally, even if there is no way to guarantee
that a rogue regime will be found out if it transfers WMD, there is also no way a state
can be sure it will escape detection – and, as described below, there are US pro-
grammes to improve the chances of such attribution. The scale of the retaliation
that might follow an act of WMD terrorism provides a powerful disincentive
against taking the risk.97 As Whiteneck puts the point, ‘Deterrence involves commu-
nicating what might happen, rather than what will happen . . . Any state would have a
high degree of uncertainty as to its ability to escape responsibility and avoid the con-
sequences of a US response.’98 In sum, the majority position in the fourth wave holds
that deterrence can operate effectively to keep states from intentionally giving WMD
to terrorists.
There is not complete consensus on this issue. Gerard Alexander and Matthew
Phillips, for example, both question whether uncertainty about avoiding detection
would be sufficient to deter rogue states from supplying nuclear weapons or materials
to terrorists.99 If the state is highly risk acceptant, they claim, the thought that it might
get away with a clandestine transfer might lead it to take the risk. They do not explain,
however, what objectives a state would want to achieve by giving WMD to terrorists
that would lead it to run this risk.
Disagreements about the probability of deterring intentional transfer lead to
different recommendations about the advisability of preventive military action.
They do not, however, lead any analyst to recommend against trying to strengthen
deterrence. Instead, there is broad agreement on the importance of making deterrence
of state assistance as effective as possible. In addition, most analysts recognize that
inadvertent leakage of NBC weapons or materials is also possible and may be the
more likely scenario. Another possibility, usually mentioned in connection with
North Korea, is that a state that has no actual intent to attack the United States by
using terrorists as a delivery system might nevertheless sell weapons or materials
as a way to raise cash. There have thus been a number of suggestions for how to
strengthen deterrence of both deliberate and unintentional supply scenarios. Figuring
out how to improve such deterrence involves questions of both declaratory strategy
and technical capabilities. Before describing debates about the appropriate
declaratory posture, this article briefly reviews the technical side of the issue.
Nuclear Forensics
Efforts to deter states or sub-national actors from aiding or enabling terrorist efforts to
acquire a nuclear device will depend on the ability to determine the origin of nuclear
materials used in a terrorist attack. This is partly a function of intelligence and police
work, but it also has a significant technical component, known as nuclear forensics.
The production facilities that make fissile materials needed for a nuclear bomb, either
































plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU), generally vary in the exact mix of iso-
topes in the materials produced at each facility. In theory, analysis of radioactive
debris and fallout after a nuclear detonation (or of materials found in an intercepted
device) could determine the general isotopic composition and age of the fissile
materials used to make the bomb. If there are samples of the fissile materials pro-
duced at various facilities, it might be possible to match the bomb materials to a
sample to determine where the fissile materials initially came from. Even if it is
not possible to establish a definite match, nuclear forensics should make it possible
to rule out certain countries as the source of the nuclear materials.100
Many fourth-wave studies attach great importance to the deterrent potential of
nuclear forensics. The post-9/11 publications that first highlighted the importance
of nuclear forensics implied that simply establishing attribution capabilities
would deter nuclear terrorism. Michael Levi, for example, noted that the Bush
administration’s reservations about deterrence rested on the premise that rogue states
could secretly supply nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists. ‘But were such
now-secret links to be exposed, deterrence could largely be restored’, he claimed.101
Subsequent studies have qualified the straightforward equation of forensics with
deterrence. They point to several problems that will have to be managed. The most
obvious is the need to have samples against which to match post-attack debris.
Both the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have
databases of information about nuclear materials, but both databases are incomplete.
This has led to a range of proposals designed to increase state participation in efforts
to create a comprehensive database.102 Even with improved access to fissile material
samples, however, it probably still will not be possible to pinpoint with certainty the
source of materials involved in an attack. Where definitive proof is lacking, Caitlin
Talmadge points out, it may be hard for political leaders to decide whether retaliation
is warranted and even harder to line up diplomatic support for military action.103
Given the potential problems that might complicate a posture based on nuclear
attribution, attention has focused on how to maximize the deterrent benefits of
nuclear forensics despite its limitations. One simple measure, recommended by
several authors, is to increase the publicity given to nuclear attribution pro-
grammes.104 Calling greater attention to US efforts and capabilities, without
revealing technical details that could enable others to design around US programmes,
would increase the chances that others might fear being identified if their nuclear
materials are used by terrorists.
Dilemmas of Declaratory Posture
Leveraging the deterrent potential of nuclear attribution programmes also involves
declaratory strategy, but dilemmas that arise in this area have produced a range of
opinion about the most appropriate posture. Initial proposals mostly suggested that
the United States should make clear in advance that any state will be held accountable
if its nuclear materials are used in a terrorist attack. Based on an assumption that other
states would likely anticipate retaliation in a case of deliberate transfer, an important
goal of such a posture is to reduce the chances of unintentional leakage by putting
pressure on states to improve the security of their nuclear materials. This approach
































thus blends compellence and deterrence. It seeks to deter states that would
contemplate intentionally giving nuclear materials to terrorists, while compelling
other states to take steps that would minimize the chances that terrorists could
acquire poorly secured materials. These coercive pressures are in turn part of a
larger strategy to deny terrorists the ability to obtain nuclear weapons or materials.
In one proposed approach of this type that draws on legal theories of liability,
Anders Corr has called for establishing a ‘negligence doctrine’.105 Under such a doc-
trine, states that are sources of materials used by terrorists could be retaliated against
if they had failed to take adequate steps to secure their materials. Robert Gallucci has
put forward a similar proposal for what he labels ‘expanded deterrence’.106 The term
is meant to convey that deterrence would be expanded to cover not just terrorists who
carry out an attack but also states whose materials were used. Gallucci states
explicitly that such a doctrine would apply both to states that deliberately transfer
and to those that inadvertently leak nuclear weapons or materials. Elbridge Colby
has subsequently also embraced the term ‘expanded deterrence’, stretching it
further to cover not only states but also private individuals who are in any way com-
plicit in making possible terrorism with WMD.107 To maximize state cooperation in
securing nuclear materials, Gallucci suggests that ‘a threat [of retaliation] would
remain even if the transfer were not authorized, but only if that government had
failed to be fully cooperative in controlling its fissile material and weapons’.108
Both Gallucci and Corr claim that, because the United States would be likely to
retaliate in any event after an act of nuclear terrorism, it makes sense to gain the
deterrent benefits of publicly declaring this ahead of time. Corr points out a second
advantage of formulating a declaratory posture before any nuclear terrorism incident:
‘a threat of limited retaliation could actually restrain the United States if voters’
ex post preference were more vengeful than their ex ante preference’.109
Although many analysts want to hold accountable any state that becomes a source
of nuclear materials, deciding what type of retaliation to threaten if a state’s materials
are employed by terrorists has proven a thorny issue. There has been willingness to
contemplate a nuclear response, but little support for mandating that retaliation must
be nuclear even in cases of intentional transfer. Many analysts simply note that the US
response could be either nuclear or non-nuclear without specifying any scenario in
which it should automatically be nuclear.110
The main reason for hesitation is that there are good reasons not to threaten
nuclear strikes against certain states whose fissile materials might not be completely
secure, including Russia and Pakistan. Russia could launch extensive nuclear
counter-strikes in response, while the United States has viewed Pakistan as an ally,
if an ambivalent one, and would not want to lose its cooperation in fighting al
Qaeda and the Taliban. Even against states that are hostile to the United States and
unable to strike back in kind, nuclear retaliation could be seen as excessive by the
international community and lead to a loss of support for the United States. This
would especially be true if leakage were inadvertent rather than deliberate. For
these reasons, Corr advocates threatening weaker states with a conventional invasion
to impose regime change rather than nuclear retaliation.111 In contrast, Whiteneck
claims it makes sense to leave the nuclear option on the table because, after Iraq,
































US conventional capabilities are stretched thin and the threat to invade and occupy
another country might lack credibility.112
There are also situations in which even conventional military retaliation might be
counterproductive. For example, actors in Pakistan’s tribal regions unhappy with
government efforts to crack down on them might try to provoke US military
strikes on Pakistan that would help them topple the central government.113 Given
the wide range of scenarios that could lead to terrorists obtaining nuclear materials
and the political complications that would follow explicitly threatening countries
like Russia or Pakistan, the majority of analysts recommend a declaratory posture
of calculated ambiguity.114 Even Phillips, despite expressing doubt about whether
intentional WMD transfers can be deterred, advocates a ‘broadly scoped, operation-
ally ambiguous declaratory policy’.115 By this, he means that all options, including
nuclear retaliation, should be on the table, but the exact nature of the military
response should not be specified in advance. This declaratory posture would also
leave open the precise level of proof the United States would require. Because of
the inherent uncertainties in attribution, Phillips and other analysts recommend that
the United States declare it will not necessarily require definitive attribution before
responding.116
Consideration of deterrence through attribution has now been underway long
enough for some analysts to have second thoughts. Michael Levi, who was an
early proponent of this approach, now recommends that the United States limit any
threat to retaliate for the transfer or leakage of nuclear materials solely to North
Korea and perhaps Iran, but in the latter case only if the United States can establish
with reasonable confidence that a transfer was deliberate. In contrast, Levi argues, the
United States should remove any hint of military retaliation from its dealings with
states like Russia or Pakistan. With these states, any leakage is likely to be unauthor-
ized. If such a state discovers a possible loss of materials, fear of suffering retaliation
might dissuade state authorities from revealing the loss. Levi concludes that the most
important goal should be to maximize cooperation from other states in giving notice
of leakage and tracking missing materials, and this requires forgoing any deterrent
threats.117 Although eliciting such cooperation is clearly important, there are risks
to eschewing a deterrent posture altogether. An alternative way to encourage
cooperation from a state that discovers or suspects a loss of nuclear materials
would be to announce that prompt reporting of a loss and cooperation to trace any
remaining missing materials will lead any retaliatory response to be reduced or with-
held altogether, depending on the degree of state culpability beforehand and
cooperation afterwards.
In an interesting complement to the foregoing proposals for deterring states from
allowing terrorists to acquire nuclear materials, David Auerswald argues that efforts
to dissuade WMD transfer should focus less on states and more on transnational crim-
inal organizations. Where inadvertent leakage of WMDmaterials occurs, he believes,
it is most likely to involve organized crime. The key to keeping WMD out of terrorist
hands, therefore, is to deter criminal groups from selling them the weapons or
materials. Because organized crime groups are motivated by profit, not ideology,
they are susceptible to deterrence by punishment. Auerswald proposes threatening
































their lives, their freedom, or their property and legitimate businesses if they are
suspected of assisting in WMD smuggling.118 He suggests deterrence by denial
might also be possible by improving interdiction of WMD shipments or finding
other ways to prevent transnational crime organizations from being able to profit
from WMD smuggling.119
Consistent with other strands of the fourth wave, this approach again involves
recognition that the basis of deterrence need not be military. As Auerswald observes,
efforts to deter criminal smuggling of WMD ‘will require placing a larger emphasis
on the nonmilitary instruments of national power’, including intelligence, law enfor-
cement, and financial tools.120 A complementary suggestion comes from Anne-Marie
Slaughter and Thomas Wright. To deter individual scientists or military officers from
working with crime groups, they recommend making ‘illegal transfer of nuclear
materials a crime against humanity triable by international tribunals and by national
courts in every country’.121 Although there are variations in individual proposals, the
fourth wave overall attaches great importance to seeking indirect deterrence of WMD
terrorism through measures to persuade states and other actors not to do anything that
could assist terrorist groups in obtaining such weapons.
Conclusions
The end of the Cold War made it possible to believe that deterrence might no longer
be needed, at least at the nuclear level. Soon after, prospects of WMD proliferation to
rogue regimes and the emergence of mass-casualty terrorism changed this initial opti-
mism to a fear that, rather than being unnecessary, deterrence might no longer be
feasible. A number of researchers have responded to these challenges by reexamining
the workings of deterrence and putting forward proposals for how to apply this strat-
egy in the current security environment. This work has produced a fourth wave in
research on deterrence.
During the Cold War, discussions of Western deterrence strategy focused on one
particular actor, the Soviet Union, in what became a relatively symmetrical situation
of mutual deterrence. Academic research was broader, but still dealt almost exclu-
sively with interstate conflicts involving rivals with similar power profiles. The
fourth wave has been driven by efforts to determine the potential efficacy of deter-
rence in a different environment characterized by multiple potential threats, from
both states and non-state actors, in which the relationships are more asymmetrical.
In this sense, the fourth wave resembles the first. It arose in response to real-world
developments and has been policy- rather than theory-oriented. Because the fourth
wave came after the second and third, however, it has also drawn on insights from
those previous waves. The fourth wave can be distinguished from them because it
has had to deal with somewhat different substantive questions, starting with the
basic question of whether deterrence is even relevant anymore.
Given how much scepticism has been expressed publicly about this question,
there are some surprising areas of consensus or near consensus in the fourth wave.
Most fundamentally, there is widespread agreement that deterrence remains relevant
and potentially usable, although there are still differences among researchers in how
































effective they think it will be overall. Because, in contrast to the ColdWar, deterrence
failure does not involve the risk of nuclear Armageddon, there is less focus on how to
make deterrence foolproof and more on how to increase the marginal effectiveness of
deterrence, particularly in dealing with terrorism.
The most significant development to emerge from this literature is movement
toward a broader conception of deterrence. Fourth-wave recommendations do not
rely heavily on threatening nuclear retaliation. Instead, there is renewed interest in
using deterrence by denial (especially against terrorism), while also retaining a
role for deterrence by punishment. There is also extensive consideration of using
not just non-nuclear but even non-military means as a basis for deterrence. The
most novel example of this is deterrence by delegitimization or counter-narrative,
which involves trying to use information and discourse to convince al Qaeda that
WMD terrorism will cause a backlash from within its intended support base.
Recent research has also emphasized making deterrence operate in indirect ways
by using it to dissuade third parties from providing assistance that would facilitate
terrorism or WMD proliferation. Collectively, research in the fourth wave is
making it abundantly clear that the field of security studies needs to broaden its
understanding of deterrence to include more than the threat of military retaliation,
whether nuclear or conventional.
Overall, the fourth wave has made a persuasive case against giving up on deter-
rence, as many seemed inclined to do after 9/11, and has put forward a number of
specific ideas for how to get some leverage from this strategy against both rogue
states and terrorist groups. Nevertheless, the fourth wave also has weak points.
Much of the literature consists of plausible suggestions, but in many cases the
underlying theoretical logic has not been sufficiently developed and the ideas have
not been tested against empirical evidence. It will be important to investigate more
systematically the non-military forms of deterrence that have been proposed,
including political, economic, legal, and informational sources of leverage. There
is also a need for more research on how far tailoring deterrence to individual cases
is likely to be necessary or more effective than more generic deterrent postures.
Given the uncertainties and disagreements evident in discussions of how to deter
nuclear terrorism, another issue that needs to be analysed more fully is how to
respond in the event the worst does happen. The atmosphere of chaos, fear, and
public anger in the aftermath of a nuclear attack will not be conducive to identifying
the most appropriate and effective response. There needs to be more explicit
discussion in advance about what responses to threaten in different circumstances,
such as varying levels of certainty about attribution or different degrees of state
culpability in allowing nuclear weapons to fall into terrorist hands. Further research
and analysis that can help policymakers and the public think through the issues
ahead of time is a pressing need.
While proposals for deterring terrorism display creative new thinking, discussions
of the prospects for deterring rogue states instead involve great continuity from Cold
War-era debates. Just as there were earlier debates about whether the Soviet Union or
Mao’s China would be deterred by the risk of losing large numbers of people in a
nuclear war, so too the fourth wave has involved sharp disagreements about
































whether states like Iran or North Korea can reliably be deterred, and whether Iraq
under Saddam would have been deterrable. The debate has implicitly relied on a
simple dichotomy. Evidence of non-rational or unreasonable behaviour by state
leaders is taken to imply a high risk of deterrence failure, while evidence of strategic
or rational thinking is taken to prove the likelihood of deterrence success. But rational
actors still sometimes challenge deterrence, while leaders prone to misperception or
grandiose objectives still sometimes refrain from launching attacks. This suggests
rationality or its absence is not alone determinative. A broader, multivariate approach
to estimating the likelihood of deterrence success or failure will be needed. On
balance, this review finds the arguments for expecting a high probability of success
in deterring rogue states persuasive, but more rigorous analysis is clearly needed to
move the debate forward.
This part of the literature remains inconclusive in part because scholars do not
always make clear what it is they want to deter. If one wishes to prevent all forms
of misbehaviour, the difficulties can be greater than if one only aims to deter a
narrow range of actions. With respect to proliferation, for example, efforts to deter
Iraq, North Korea, and Iran from crossing certain thresholds in nuclear development
or to compel them to comply fully with non-proliferation commitments have often
failed. Some observers have inferred from this that these states will cross all red-
lines and hence are not adequately subject to deterrence.122 Yet none of these
states has ever launched a nuclear attack nor, to our knowledge, ever supplied
WMD to terrorists. In short, deterring weapons acquisition is harder than deterring
use, so that difficulties preventing the former might not imply anything about
preventing the latter.
It is hard to coerce states not to acquire new capabilities because they might see
these as important for their own security. But if their capabilities might subsequently
be used to attack the other side, then the other side clearly has overriding national
interests at stake. Deterrence is hence more credible when it seeks to prevent states
from using their capabilities unprovoked. And preventing attacks remains the most
important goal for deterrence. Although one might wish to stop all acts of defiance
toward the United States or the international community, it is not necessary to
deter every act of defiance because most of them do not directly kill people.
Rather than lump a range of policy goals together when discussing the prospects
for deterrence, there is a need to differentiate and be clearer about the intended
goals of a deterrence strategy.123
Folk wisdom in the strategic community holds that those involved in the planning
process should ask themselves whom they wish to deter from doing what, and by
what means. The recent move toward tailored deterrence has led to even greater
emphasis on starting the deterrence planning process by developing a profile of the
specific adversary.124 Putting the question of who is to be deterred first, without
specifying what to deter, could lead to a focus on trying to prevent all forms of
defiance and misbehaviour by those adversaries. This approach also encourages a
focus on actor idiosyncrasies and the difficulties of ascertaining what the actor
values that could be held at risk. All of this is likely to lead to scepticism about
the prospects for deterring the actor at all. The difficulties of understanding other
































actors should not be minimized, but it makes no sense to ask whether an actor will be
easy or hard to deter if one has not specified what actions one seeks to prevent. Rather
than whom, the first question should be what to deter. It is inherently more plausible –
and more important – to deter some actions than others. Efforts to deter WMD
attacks or WMD transfers to terrorists will automatically appear more credible,
and generally matter more, than efforts to deter lesser provocations. The fourth
wave could contribute more to policy debates if it gave more careful consideration
to the question of what actions should be the primary focus of a deterrence strategy.
Despite the weaknesses discussed here, the fourth wave has generated valuable
innovations in deterrence thinking. Indeed, the number and diversity of the studies
make this the most exciting period for deterrence research in several decades. The
disappearance of the Soviet Union and emergence of new threats from rogue
regimes and terrorism did not spell the end for deterrence as either a strategy or a
subject of theorizing. Instead, these developments have spurred a move toward a
broader conception in which either military or non-military means, or a combination,
could be considered part of a deterrence strategy. If the fourth wave fulfils its
potential, it could lead to changes in both deterrence theory and practice.
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